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“Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself
policymaking properly left, under the separation of powers, to the
Executive.”1
Judicial friction2 in the course of deciding administrative law controversies
can generate sparks, igniting law-advancing ideas3 that sometimes result in legal

1. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(referring to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). See
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 551 (6th ed. 2013) [hereinafter LAWSON,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] (“Despite its breadth, the broad reading of Chevron does not
require judicial deference to all agency legal interpretations.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (“The original
rationale for the creation of . . . agencies was to relieve Congress of some of the burdens of
legislating.”); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing At All: The Origins of
the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) [hereinafter Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s
Origins] (“For more than a quarter of a century, federal administrative law has been dominated by
the so-called Chevron doctrine . . . .”) (emphasis added). See generally Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s
Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1325 (2008) (“Chevron . . . does not embrace any single rationale
for deference to agency statutory interpretation.”).
2. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1873 n.4 (recognizing the confusion that
agency in administrative law creates, stating that “[t]he Chief Justice’s discomfort with the growth
of agency power . . . is perhaps understandable”). See also id. at 1873 (“A few words in response
to the dissent. The question on which we granted certiorari was whether ‘a court should apply
Chevron to review an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.’” (emphasis added)).
3. This holds true, despite one view that “judges are passive interpreters” and that the “role
[of judges] is semantic.” Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scaliagarner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism [hereinafter Posner, Scalia’s Incoherence].
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breakthroughs.4 The starting premise for resolving any administrative law
controversy is that agencies are only authorized to make legally valid decisions
where Congress has granted the particular agency such authority.5 Courts will
reverse an agency’s erroneous answer to a statutory interpretation question, even
if the statute is one the agency administers.6
However, when a court determines that an agency is potentially empowered
to issue a particular ruling, further judicial analysis and evaluation ensues,
followed by the particular court’s own determination and issuance of the court’s
judgment.7 Thus, prior to the conception of Chevron deference,8 when an

4. See, e.g., LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 459 (“When
compared to pre-1984 law, Chevron appears to offer the virtue of simplicity: instead of an
indeterminate, multi-factor test for deference, one merely asks whether the statute or regulation in
question is clear and, if not, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”).
5. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1869 (“Both [the] power [of agencies] to
act and how they are to act is authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act
improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”)
(emphasis added). See also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593–94 (2004)
(“[There is] virtually unanimous accord in understanding the [agency] to forbid only discrimination
preferring young to old. . . . The very strength of this consensus is enough to rule out any serious
claim of ambiguity, and congressional silence after years of judicial interpretation supports
adherence to the traditional view.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467
U.S. at 836–37 (stating that both courts and agencies are prohibited from expanding a statute past
the explicit boundaries of authority established by Congress); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 122–23
(1978) (finding that, if “Congress intended the [Securities and Exchange] Commission to have the
power” that the Commission purported to exercise, then Congress likely “could and would have
authorized [the Commission] more clearly than [Congress] did,” and “[t]he absence of any truly
persuasive legislative history to support the Commission’s view, and the entire statutory scheme
suggesting that in fact the Commission is not so empowered, reinforce[d] [the Court’s] conclusion
that . . . no such power exists”).
6. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 540 U.S. at 584–85, 600 (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s
decision that upheld the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s finding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibited employers from discriminating against
younger workers in favor of older workers). See also Sloan, 436 U.S. at 106–08, 122–23 (affirming
the Second Circuit’s decision that a series of SEC orders suspending the trading of a certain stock
was legally invalid, based on the SEC overstepping its statutory authority to suspend trading in
certain situations).
7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.”).
8. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989) (describing deference as “not necessarily meaning anything more
than considering [the Executive Branch’s views concerning a statute’s meaning] with attentiveness
and profound respect[;] . . . say[ing] that those views, if at least reasonable, will ever be binding . .
. is . . . seemingly a striking abdication of judicial responsibility”). See also Lawson & Kam,
Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 11 (“[L]egal deference [is] the extent to which courts are
obliged to give a certain degree of deference to agency legal decisions simply because they are
legal decisions of agencies.”).
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agency concluded that a particular statute was beset by ambiguities9 or evinced
gaps10 pertaining to a particular issue, the agency proceeded to make its ruling.11
If such rulings were challenged by an appeal to the courts, then the correctness
and legal validity of such rulings were ultimately resolved at the discretion of
the judiciary.12
A two-step process typically occurred to determine administrative law
controversies that involved an agency interpreting and applying statutes. First,
agencies dealing with such issues would fashion interpretations that resolved the
detected ambiguities or filled the perceived gaps that Congress left.13 Then, if
the agency’s interpretations and applications were disputed, the courts would
decide their validity and whether they should be followed as U.S. law.14
However, the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.15 decision created a significant shift in the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach
to administrative law deference jurisprudence with respect to agency decisions.16
This Article will discuss that shift, its consequences, and its impact on the
judiciary’s intellectual digestion of the substantive administrative law
implications. This Article also examines two widely discussed dissents by
Justice Scalia in two Chevron deference cases.17

9. See State v. Edwards, 87 A.3d 1144, 1147 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (“The test to determine
ambiguity is whether [a] statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation . . . .”).
10. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142 (1921)
(providing that “[w]hen [statutory] law has left the situation uncovered by any pre-existing rule,
there is nothing to do except to have some impartial arbiter declare what fair and reasonable
[persons] . . . ought in such circumstances to do”).
11. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136, 138 (1944) (finding that an
agency’s determination was valid because the administrator was empowered “to reach conclusions
[about] conduct without the law”).
12. See id. at 140 (stating that “the rulings, interpretations and opinions” of an administrative
agency are persuasive but “not controlling upon the courts”). See also CARDOZO, supra note 10,
at 143 (theorizing that the basis for giving the judiciary the final ruling in statutory interpretation is
the belief that “nine times out of ten, if not oftener, the conduct of right-minded [persons] would
not have been different if the rule embodied in the decision had been announced by statute in
advance”).
13. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 (commenting that an agency’s determination is “made in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case”).
14. Id. at 140 (explaining that, while a court will consider an agency’s interpretation in their
deliberations, the court must weigh various factors to determine if the agency’s interpretation and
application of a statute are correct).
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. See Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 2 (“Chevron virtually defines
modern administrative law.”).
17. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1005
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Part I addresses the role Chevron plays in judicial review of agency decisions.
Part II examines Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Mead,18 followed by
a discussion in Part III of his later dissent in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.19 Part IV evaluates the
degree of harmony or conflict that materializes when Justice Scalia’s two
dissents are analyzed in light of the orthodox principles Chevron has sought to
engender. Finally, Part V concludes that Chevron still has significance for
administrative law determinations and that Justice Scalia may be returning to the
fold.
I. THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
DETERMINATIONS
A. Pre-Chevron Administrative Law Determinations Change from “What
Power?” to “How Much Power?”
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, courts tended to treat an
agency’s conclusion about a statute’s interpretation and application as
persuasive authority.20 Courts would apply factors that the Supreme Court set
forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.21 to decide whether to overturn the particular
agency’s determinations.22 After enactment of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA),23 a combination of Skidmore deference and APA analysis and
application prevailed.24 In making these decisions, the judiciary’s fundamental
obligations included assessing the degree of deference merited by an agency’s
decision on the whole.25

18. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
19. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
20. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that agency
determinations, “while not controlling upon the courts,” do have the “power to persuade”).
21. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
22. See id. at 140.
23. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706 (2012)).
24. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 673, 675 (2007)
(pointing out that before the Chevron decision, the Supreme Court often favored its own standards
of review of administrative decisions over the APA standards).
25. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2005) (“While Chevron deference means that an agency, not a court,
exercises interpretive control, Skidmore deference means just the opposite.” (emphasis added)).
See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001), (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is
some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which it did not even bother to cite.” (citation omitted)). See generally Doug Geyser, Note, Courts
Still “Say What the Law Is”: Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies after Brand
X, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2130 (2006) (“[Mead] clarified that only agency actions taken with
a certain degree of formality are entitled to Chevron-style deference . . . .”).
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B. The Most Recent Supreme Court Case Elucidates Key Issues in
Administrative Law Agency Promulgations
1. Bias May Affect Decisions of Agency Administrators
The U.S. Supreme Court City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC26 decision was the
Court’s most recent opportunity to rule on “whether a court must defer under
Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the
scope of the agency’s statutory authority (that is, its jurisdiction).”27 Such an
agency determination may create an inherent conflict of interest, with the
possibility of bias28 impacting the legal purity of the agency’s judgment, and
thus, its own decision.
This Article readily concedes that an agency is not a court. Therefore, the
rigidity and formality of the adversary principle, operative in legal proceedings
before a court, do not apply in the context of an agency. Yet, “the [legal] maxim
that no [person] is to be a judge in his own cause should be held sacred.”29
Arguably, somewhat similar substantive legal principles may also apply to an
agency’s determination.30 However, while agencies may be perceived legally
as artificial persons,31 the APA expressly excludes them from the definition of
“person.”32 Congress may have excluded agencies from this definition precisely
to prevent biased agency actions.33 Therefore, conceptions of bias may be
relevant to an agency appointee’s pecuniary interest in a matter before the
agency for adjudication, rather than the agency’s own “personal” interest in its
own conceivable “self-aggrandizement.”34
26. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
27. Id. at 1868.
28. See, e.g., King (De Vesci) v. Justices of Queen’s Cnty., [1908] 2 I.R. 285, 294 (K.B.)
(“[B]ias . . . [is] a real likelihood of an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (H.L.) 315 (dictating that this
maxim applies both in situations where a person has a personal interest and where he does not).
30. See, e.g., Stephen J. Leacock, Public Utility Regulation in a Developing Country, 8 LAW.
AMS. 338, 349–50 (1976) (applying the principles of bias to Barbadian persons who, similar to
U.S. agency administrators, act quasi-judicially on a Board to administer a statute, and mandating
that they be “disinterested” parties).
31. See, e.g., J. Nick Badgerow, Walking the Line: Government Lawyer Ethics, 12 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 437, 445 (2003) (“[A]n agency is an artificial person comprised of individual
constituents . . . .”).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (West 2014) (defining “person” as “an individual, partnership,
corporation, association . . . other than an agency” (emphasis added)).
33. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013).
34. Id. (“[W]e have applied Chevron where concerns about agency self-aggrandizement are
at their apogee: in cases where an agency’s expansive construction of the extent of its own power
would have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.” (emphasis added)). In
another context, agency preemption of state law, agency self-aggrandizement also demands
consideration. See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 667, 698 (2011) (“[T]he danger of agency self-aggrandizement [in the context of federal
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2. Jurisdictional Concerns Are Irrelevant to Agency Determinations
Whereas distinctions between jurisdiction and non-jurisdiction are highly
relevant to courts of law, such distinctions do not have identical relevance in the
context of determining the parameters of authority an agency possesses under
administrative law. As Justice Scalia explained: “[t]he misconception that there
are, for Chevron purposes, separate ‘jurisdictional’ questions on which no
deference is due derives, perhaps, from a reflexive extension to agencies of the
very real division between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional that is applicable
to courts.”35
Thus, in City of Arlington, Tex., the Supreme Court majority dismissed the
assertion of any dichotomy of these principles as “a mirage” and concluded that
the fundamental issue is more attenuated.36 The majority enunciated that “[n]o
matter how [the issue] is framed, the question a court faces when confronted
with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply,
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”37
3. Majority v. Dissent: Determining the Scope of the Agency’s Power from
Congress
The City of Arlington, Tex. majority and dissent agreed that the fundamental
question before the Supreme Court was whether the agency had acted within its
authority.38 However, Chief Justice Roberts expressed in his dissent that his
overriding concern was the constitutional role of the judiciary—as one of the
three coequal branches of government—in the U.S. separation of powers legal
firmament to hold other branches of government accountable.39 In his opinion,
“[a] court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, that
the agency is entitled to deference.”40
The difference between the conclusions of the majority and the dissent lay in
whether the detection of Congress’s intention was, as the dissent stated, a

preemption of state law through agency action] is sometimes cited as weighing against the
application of Chevron deference.”).
35. City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 1868, 1872.
37. Id. at 1868.
38. Id. at 1868. See also id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The appropriate question is
whether the [congressional] delegation [of authority] covers the ‘specific provision’ and ‘particular
question’ before the court.” (citation omitted)). The majority and the dissent also agreed that the
judiciary may properly defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision in
circumstances in which Congress clearly intended the courts to do so. Id. at 1872 (“The dissent is
correct that . . . for Chevron deference to apply, the agency must have received congressional
authority to determine the particular matter at issue in the particular matter adopted.”).
39. Id. at 1886 (“[T]here is . . . firmly rooted in our constitutional structure . . . the obligation
of the Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches [of
government] do so as well.”).
40. Id. at 1877 (emphasis added).
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“question [that] is beyond the Chevron pale.”41 The dissent stated that a court
must decide whether or not the agency was legally empowered to have made the
decision at issue in the first place.42 According to the dissent, courts should
decide that question before the issue of according Chevron deference to the
agency’s decision is reached.43 This distinction marks the line “in the sand”
between the majority’s and dissent’s conclusions.44 The majority reasoned that
the ultimate determination was whether the agency had stayed within the
boundaries of Congress’ grant of authority, and found that Chevron deference
applied automatically “because Congress ha[d] unambiguously vested the FCC
with general authority to administer [the statute] . . . .”45 While at least one
Justice declared that the agency had remained within its boundaries,46 the dissent
concluded that the agency had overstepped the line.47
4. Skidmore Foreshadowed the Agency Authority Issue, but Cases Continue
to Arise
The issue of an agency appropriating to itself more extensive parameters of
authority than Congress intended had been analyzed and evaluated prior to
Chevron and City of Arlington, Tex. Indeed, the question of staying “within the
bounds of its statutory authority,” addressed in City of Arlington, Tex.,48 was
precisely the issue before the U.S. Supreme Court almost seven decades earlier
in Skidmore.49 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court decided that, despite a lack of
express legal authority to interpret a particular statute, an agency would likely
have the experience and expertise to reach a more “informed judgment” on
which courts could rely when deferring to their interpretation.50 Therefore, the
Supreme Court in Skidmore created deference criteria that constrained courts to
consider the “thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity
of [the agency’s] reasoning, [the agency’s] consistency with earlier and later

41. Id. at 1883 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. (“[W]hether Congress wants us to [defer to an agency’s interpretation] is a question
that courts, not agencies, must decide.”).
44. Id. at 1874 (“Where we differ from the dissent is in . . . the dissent[‘s proposal] that even
when general rulemaking authority is clear, every agency rule must be subjected to a de novo
judicial determination of whether the particular issue was committed to agency discretion.”).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1875–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
47. Id. at 1884–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1868.
49. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–38 (1944) (finding that the agency had not
exceeded its authority in interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act to grant compensation to certain
employees).
50. Id. at 140.
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pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”51
5. The Chevron Doctrine Provides a Modern Framework for Analyzing
Agency Interpretations
Unfortunately, the Skidmore decision did not ultimately prove to be a panacea
with regard to agency deference jurisprudence.52 Thus, forty years after the
Skidmore decision, the Supreme Court enunciated a modern benchmark
substantive approach to determining the degree of deference to which agency
decisions are entitled.53 However, views differ with respect to Chevron’s
substantive meaning54 and its legal impact on administrative law principles.55
51. Id. See also Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 849 (2010) (“In one
sense, Skidmore is much more straightforward than Chevron because Skidmore does not include
multiple steps and multiple versions.”).
52. See Beermann, supra note 51, at 849 (noting that “[t]o some . . . a more constrained,
certain doctrine is preferable to Skidmore” (footnote omitted)).
53. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984). See
also Scalia, supra note 8, at 512 (“It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine—except in
the clarity and the seemingly categorical nature of its expression—is entirely new law.” (emphases
added)).
54. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 34, at 705 (“Chevron’s presumption of delegation through
ambiguity to agency expertise is quite reasonable.”); Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of
a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative
Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 834 (2007) (“[B]oth Skidmore and Chevron partially reinforce
each other[;] . . . ultimate interpretive authority is based upon institutional competence.”); Lawson
& Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 55 (“By mid- to late-1985, near Chevron’s first
anniversary, many decisions across many circuits could be cited for the proposition that the twostep Chevron framework . . . was simply settled law.”); Randolph J. May, Defining Deference
Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433, 448
(2010) (“Chevron deference is primarily all about [the] constitutional commitment to political
accountability.”); Rajiv Mohan, Chevron and the President’s Role in the Legislative Process, 64
ADMIN. L. REV. 793, 794 (2012) (“In Chevron . . ., the Supreme Court held that courts should defer
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.” (citation and footnote omitted)).
But see Beermann, supra note 51, at 784 (“Chevron’s multiple meanings make analysis of Chevron
very difficult.”); Foote, supra note 24, at 697 (“Chevron and its progeny misstate the core function
of public administration and misconstrue the legal authority for the administrative implementation
of statutory programs.”); William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended
Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 254 (2009) (“Chevron does not support deference to agency
procedural decisions . . . .” (emphasis added)); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron-Restoring Judicial
Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 590 (2008) (“[T]he Chevron
framework is a policy decision by a Court that said it was unqualified to make policy decisions. . .
[T]he deference Chevron dictates is a rebuttable presumption.”).
55. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 1, at 1272 (“Although Chevron has since become the most
cited case in modern public law, its theoretical underpinnings remain uncertain.” (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Foote, supra note 24, at 677 (“[T]he judge-made Chevron
doctrines have had pernicious effects.”); Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 2
(“Even after almost thirty years and thousands of recitations, unanswered questions about this
Chevron framework abound.”). See also Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron
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In any event, the Chevron mandate first requires a clear intent of Congress to
allocate authority to the agency to administer the particular statute being
interpreted.56 Second, the court must determine whether the statute was either
“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” or issues in
controversy.57 Third, the court must be persuaded that, in light of the first and
second prongs, the agency was entitled to significant deference in interpreting
the statute as it did.58
Of course, if it were proven that Congress expressly and unambiguously
allocated specific authority for an agency to take certain action, judicial
deference to the agency’s decisions would be assured.59 However, clarity with
regard to congressional intent is not guaranteed.60 Therefore, judicial detection
of the quantum of authority that an agency has been expressly or impliedly
allocated by Congress can be enigmatic.61 When the courts determine that
Congress has not expressly stated the specific authority assigned to an agency,
the courts must determine whether or not to give the agency’s interpretation
Chevron deference.62
Chevron is a thirty-year-old decision, and in the context of City of Arlington,
Tex., “the first question presented [was] [w]hether . . . a court should apply
Chevron [deference] to . . . an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.”63
The particular significance of this determination stemmed from the inescapable
conflict of interest inherent in the agency’s determination of the parameters of
its own jurisdiction.64

from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 726 (2007) (“Chevron has proved to be less
clear, predictable, and simple than originally envisioned.”).
56. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.
57. Id. at 843.
58. Id. (“[T]he question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”). See also City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)
(explaining that when a statute is ambiguous, Congress must have “‘understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved . . . by the agency, and desired [that] the agency (rather than the courts) . . .
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows’” (citation omitted)).
59. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter . . . .”).
60. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227, 229 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(differentiating between express and implied congressional intent to grant an agency particular
authority); Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 843–44 (noting that sometimes Congress purposefully
leaves ambiguous provisions or gaps in statutes for agencies to interpret).
61. See Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 73.
62. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (“Chevron[] deference
to [an agency’s] statutory interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial construction
have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
467 U.S. at 843; Jordan, supra note 54, at 284 n.197 (providing further examples for the boundaries
of permissible agency action under an ambiguous statute).
63. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2013) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See supra Part I.B.1.
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However, although the Chevron decision has articulated the appropriate
modern test of deference, arguably, the court did not explicitly enunciate how to
unerringly detect “clear” congressional intent for an agency to have a particular
authority.65 In Chevron, the judiciary failed to specifically articulate the
parameters of identifying congressional intent in the context of apparently
incomplete congressional expressions of such intent.66 A growing number of
courts have grappled with this conundrum since the time of the Chevron
decision.67
Unfortunately, without express congressional statements within the statute,
the extent to which the agency has the authority to interpret a particular matter
remains unclear.68 Therefore, the judiciary must do the best that it can to
elucidate this confusion.69 To avoid this potential conflict, it is important to
understand the substantive principles of Chevron deference that courts must
apply.70
C. Distinguishing Chevron from Skidmore
There are substantial differences between the facts and circumstances of the
Chevron controversy and those in Skidmore.71 Chevron addressed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s interpretation of an ambiguity in the
Clean Air Act72 and assessed whether or not Congress had assigned the EPA
authority to interpret the statute in the particular manner selected by that
agency.73 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Skidmore exhaustively analyzed the
interpretations made by an administrator, who had ruled that waiting time did

65. See Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 73.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 73–74 (positing that the answer for this difficulty in interpretation might lie outside
the Chevron doctrine).
68. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court refuses to establish a bright-line rule for distinguishing express intent from implied
intent, and that even upon determining the category of intent, “the uncertainty is not at an end”).
69. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (establishing the
test that courts can use because the agency’s “scope” of authority is in question); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 171 (1803) (positing that some legal questions are “properly
determinable in the courts” (emphasis added)).
70. See Beermann, supra note 51, at 807–08 (highlighting the continuing difficulties of
applying the Chevron framework and clarifications that the Supreme Court can make).
71. Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40
(1984), with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 134–37 (1944).
72. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91–604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7614 (2012)).
73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 840 (stating that the issue revolved around whether or
not the EPA had authority to “allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the
same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’”).
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not qualify as working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act.74 The Court
determined the administrator was acting without an express congressional
authority to take the action.75 The Court reasoned that the administrator’s
determinations “d[id] not constitute an interpretation of the Act or a standard for
judging factual situations which binds a district court’s processes, as an
authoritative pronouncement of a higher court might do.”76 Rather, the pertinent
interpretations adopted by the administrator were ruled by the Supreme Court to
be persuasive, but not legally binding on the Court in the context of that
particular case.77
However, the Chevron court noted that the EPA was expressly authorized by
Congress in the Clean Air Act “to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQ’s)[,] . . . publish a list of categories of sources of pollution[,]
and . . . establish new source performance standards (NSPS) for each.”78 The
EPA’s initial actions failed to attain the mandated goals set by Congress to have
a certain level of NAAQ’s by 1975,79 and Congressional efforts to remedy the
unresolved problems by follow-up legislation were similarly unsuccessful.80 In
fact, it was the political fallout from the clash of national antithetical economic
constituencies in the U.S. that prevented Congress from statutorily resolving the
nationwide problems relating to air quality issues.81 Thereupon, the EPA rose
to the occasion and issued rulings82 specifically calibrated to fill the gaps left by
this congressional failure until such time as Congress succeeded in enacting
further legislation.83
In adjudicating the challenges to the EPA’s actions, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the challenge purported to impugn the EPA’s actions by
“center[ing] on the wisdom of the [EPA]’s policy, rather than whether [the
policy] is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress . . . .”84 The
challenge legally failed because “[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom
of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
74. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134, 139 (“The conclusion of the Administrator . . . is that the
general tests which he has suggested point to the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these
employees from the workweek . . . .”).
75. Id. at 139 (“There is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts should pay
to the Administrator’s conclusions.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 140.
78. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 846 (naming section 109 of the 1970 Amendments as
the source for the express authority).
79. Id. at 847.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 847, 851–53.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 847–48, 857–59 (noting the EPA’s ultimate adoption of a “plantwide definition” of
“sources,” as opposed to a definition that distinguished between “nonattainment areas and PSD
areas”).
84. Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
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the public interest are not judicial ones . . . .”85 Moreover, the challenge failed
because the EPA was assigned authority by Congress to act under the provisions
of the Clean Air Act.86 The Court concluded that the EPA’s interpretation was
legally valid because it was “a permissible construction of the [Clean Air
Act].”87 In essence, the Chevron Court held that when reviewing an
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statutory question, a court must first
determine whether Congress’ intent is clearly expressed in the statute or
legislative history pertinent to the question in controversy.88
The Court also reasoned that if the judiciary clearly and unambiguously
determines Congress’ intent, then a court must exercise its own self-restraint and
accord full deference to the interpretation enunciated by the agency.89 However,
when a court deduces that the statute is either silent or ambiguous with respect
to the question in controversy, then a court must determine whether or not
Congress’ intent was to either expressly or impliedly assign discretionary
authority to the agency.90 Such delegated congressional authority would
empower the agency with discretion to resolve any ambiguities by filling the
gaps left by Congress in the statutory mandate.91 If a court concluded that
Congress had undeniably assigned express or implied discretionary authority to
the agency responsible for administering the statute, then the court “should not
disturb” the agency’s choice.92 This judicial obligation of “non-disturbance”
was thus predicated on a court’s conclusions that the agency’s interpretation was
convincingly reasonable and not antithetical to the legislative history or
discernible congressional intent.93
Finally, a court should not disrupt the agency’s interpretation unless it
concludes that the agency’s interpretation was “arbitrary, capricious,” or
otherwise “manifestly contrary to the [enabling] statute” that the agency was
expressly assigned the power to administer.94 Therefore, the Supreme Court
reasoned that Chevron deference means that an administering agency “to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities”95 should be accorded
judicial deference in legally appropriate circumstances.96 Thus, if the
administrative agency has provided a reasonable answer to the question posed

85. Id.
86. Id. at 843–44, 866.
87. Id. at 866.
88. Id. at 842–43.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 843.
91. Id. at 843–44.
92. Id. at 845.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 844.
95. Id. at 865.
96. Id. at 865–66 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision . . .
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, . . . the challenge must fail.”).
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by the pertinent statute by selecting a reasonably permissible construction of that
statute, the court should not overturn the agency’s interpretation simply because
the court may disagree with it.97
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT IN MEAD
A. Mead’s Majority Questions the Chevron Deference Test
In Mead, the Supreme Court majority concluded that a court must examine if
Congress assigned the agency the authority “to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation . . . was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority”98 in order to determine whether or not an agency should be
accorded Chevron deference.99 The Mead Court also provided examples of
“rulemaking or adjudication” that could confirm that the agency had been
assigned the appropriate congressional authority.100 The Court concluded,
however, that affording Chevron deference to an agency’s actions is sometimes
appropriate even if the agency has not invoked the formal “rulemaking or
adjudication” processes.101
Thus, the ultimate test of an agency’s entitlement to Chevron deference
required a determination of congressional intent.102 In Mead, the Supreme Court
concluded that the United States Customs Service (Customs) had not been
assigned congressional authority to make rules endowed with the “force of
law,”103 and therefore, the action taken by the agency did not legally merit
Chevron deference.104
Essentially, the Mead Court did not interpret the controversy as simply a
matter of process-selection for Customs.105 Rather, it seems that the Supreme
Court perceived fundamental concerns of fairness to the impacted businesses as
decisive.106 The majority’s perceptions appeared to focus on substantive
equitable doctrines, such as freedom from unfair surprise.107 Other important

97. Id. at 865 (“Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.”).
98. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
99. Id. See also Bressman, supra note 25, at 1475–88 (discussing the ramifications of the
Mead holding on future administrative law decisions); Dickinson, supra note 34, at 676 (stating
that, in Mead, “the [Supreme] Court transformed Chevron’s hard-and-fast rule of deference to
agency interpretations to a more context-specific inquiry into congressional intent to delegate”);
Geyser, supra note 25, at 2164 (discussing the expansion of the Chevron doctrine in Mead).
100. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30.
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id. at 229–31.
103. Id. at 231–32.
104. Id. at 231–34.
105. See id. at 232.
106. Id. at 233–34.
107. See id. at 233.
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factors that the Court considered, such as opportunities for interested parties to
express their views, also seemed critical to its conclusion.108
B. Justice Scalia’s Dissent: Replacing Chevron
In Justice Scalia’s Mead dissent, he disagreed with the majority opinion for at
least four main reasons.109 First, he reasoned that the Court inappropriately
added an additional step to the Chevron deference test.110 He proposed that this
addition impermissibly required that the agency be allowed to act with the “force
of law.”111
Second, Justice Scalia was exceptionally concerned that the court might be
discarding the Chevron test of deference and resurrecting a partially modified
Skidmore test.112 Third, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that the agency’s interpretation must be restricted to the context of exercising
the agency’s “rulemaking or adjudication” authority.113
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that if an agency had the congressional authority
to act with the “force of law” only in the rulemaking or adjudicatory context,
then certain consequences would be inevitable.114 For example, instead of
“formal adjudication,” the agency might be coerced into exclusively making use
of one of the “safe harbor” methods of “notice-and-comment” rulemaking when
interpreting a statute.115 This course of agency action could later force the
judiciary to overturn its own prior opinions.116 Justice Scalia reasoned that the
majority would foreclose some agencies from access to Chevron deference
whenever such agencies were not assigned congressional authority to “make
rules carrying the force of law.”117
At first glance, the Mead majority may conceivably appear to add an
additional step to the Chevron test.118 However, on closer examination and
analysis, the majority’s decision may be reconciled with the language articulated
by the Supreme Court in Chevron.
C. Reconciling Chevron and Mead
A careful analysis of the Mead majority decision clearly indicates that no
reconciliation of competing policy choices by the agency was at issue in
108. See id.
109. See id. at 239–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 239, 245–46.
111. Id. at 239.
112. See id. at 250.
113. Id. at 252–53.
114. Id. at 245.
115. Id. at 245–46.
116. Id. at 246–49 (remarking that in “no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, . . .
ha[s the Supreme Court] allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute to be set aside by an agency”).
117. See id. at 239.
118. See id.
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Mead.119 However, this reconciliation was precisely the issue in controversy in
Chevron.120 Essentially, the Mead Court was not modifying the test for
determining entitlement to Chevron deference.121 Rather, the Court simply
sought to restate congressional intent as the quintessential component of
Chevron deference.122
On the other hand, Chevron enunciated that an agency should be accorded
judicial deference when its interpretation of a statute is “reasonable” and
Congress has unambiguously “committed to the agency’s care [the
responsibility of interpreting] the statute” in question.123 So, although the
Chevron Court did not specifically use the phrase “force of law,” it can be
inferred that the judiciary would accord this high level of deference only to
agencies explicitly assigned congressional authority to administer the statute
under scrutiny in carefully calibrated circumstances.124 The majority in Mead
appeared to conclude that, whereas the resolution of evident policy choices
would make the agency’s intellectual struggle patent,125 a more attenuated
analysis of underlying consequences would be best attained by conducting a
Skidmore analysis and evaluation.126
D. Scalia’s Other Concerns: The Inevitable Confusion Created by Multiple
Deference Standards
1. Mead’s Changes to the Chevron Test May Lead to Agency Troubles
In Mead, Justice Scalia questioned whether the Supreme Court was seeking
to restore the prior “Skidmore deference” test in administrative law.127 He
reasoned that if the Supreme Court chose to resurrect the previously abrogated
Skidmore deference test, then agencies and litigants would be at a
disadvantage.128 Restoring Skidmore deference would unfairly deprive agencies
and litigants of knowing what type of deference ruled supreme in American

119. See id. at 221 (describing the single policy concern).
120. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“[T]he decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”).
121. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 237–38 (noting that different situations and statutes can call for
tests of deference other than that enunciated by Chevron).
122. Id. at 227.
123. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 845.
124. See id. at 866; supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (providing the holding of
Chevron).
125. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
126. See id. at 227 (“The Customs ruling at issue here fails to qualify [for Chevron deference],
although the possibility that it deserves some deference under Skidmore leads us to vacate and
remand.” (emphasis added)).
127. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 240–41.
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administrative law to any degree of reasonable certainty.129 In the view of one
commentator:
[W]ere the [Mead] doctrine actually to devolve into a case-by-case
search for congressional intent, Chevron would lose all utility as a
bright-line rule, and all Chevron cases would be thrown into . . .
unpredictable chaos . . . . In short, all of Justice Scalia’s worst fears
would be realized.130
In reality, an unavoidable hiatus would arise until the Supreme Court decided
each case involving agency statutory interpretation.131 This would also unfairly
deprive the entire legal community of anticipated guidance from the Supreme
Court.132
2. Mead Highlights the Debate on the Effect that Chevron had on Skidmore
Deference
The issue of abrogation or continued survival of Skidmore deference was
particularly important to Justice Scalia in Mead.133 In Scalia’s opinion, the
Supreme Court did not intend to abrogate Skidmore deference through its preChevron decisions.134 However, Scalia’s dissenting opinion decisively
concluded that the Supreme Court unequivocally abrogated Skidmore deference
by virtue of its Chevron decision and post-Chevron jurisprudence.135
Justice Scalia is not necessarily correct in proposing that the Supreme Court
eliminated Skidmore deference principles through its Chevron decision. In
reality, the Supreme Court cited Skidmore without declaring that the decision
was being overruled.136 Therefore, opposing points of view may exist. For
example, the Supreme Court may have simply declined to follow or even apply
the Skidmore deference analysis because the specific issue in Chevron did not
require application or consideration of that test.137
However, in a different context, the Supreme Court explained the legal effect
of such conduct by the Court.138 Declining to follow Skidmore—sub silentio—
129. See id. at 241, 245.
130. See Dickinson, supra note 34, at 688.
131. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 238 (explaining that courts must decide which level of deference a
case requires).
132. Id. at 240–41, 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 256.
134. See id. at 241.
135. See id. at 241, 253–55 (exploring and, ultimately discounting, an “exception” case that
provides support for the majority’s theory post-Chevron).
136. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 865 n.40 (1984).
137. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 (stating that “[t]he Court . . . said nothing in Chevron to
eliminate Skidmore’s recognition of various justifications for deference depending on the statutory
circumstances and agency action”).
138. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 499 n.16 (1958) (“Certainly it
must be assumed that the Court would refrain from settling sub silentio an issue of such obvious
importance and difficulty plainly requiring a clearly expressed disposition.”).

150

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:133

does not unequivocally justify a conclusion that the Supreme Court completely
or even partially overruled Skidmore as a controlling precedent with respect to
according judicial deference to agency decisions. Arguably, and as the Mead
Supreme Court decision acknowledged by its judgment, surviving Mead
precedential validity is also tenable.139
Additionally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Mead majority because the
method of dissemination of the agency’s viewpoint140 was not addressed in
Chevron.141 According to Justice Scalia, if the majority limited an agency to
promulgating an interpretation through formal proceedings only, it would be
adding an additional step to the Chevron test.142 Justice Scalia did not perceive
the Chevron decision to mandate such a formal interpretation process.143
One may propose that prevention of unfair surprise is an important
requirement in administrative agency behavior and that making use of formal
proceedings to promulgate agency policy changes would effectively eliminate
unfair surprise.144 However, prevention of unfair surprise is not a relevant
consideration in every action that an agency takes.145 The use of formal
proceedings146 is intended to prevent unfair surprise when other means of
resolving a matter before the agency might be unfair.147 However, in Mead, the
corporation acting as an importer was the party impacted by the agency action.148
139. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 238–39 (“Since the Skidmore assessment called for here ought to
be made in the first instance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the CIT, [the Court]
. . . vacate[s] the judgment and remand[s] the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” (emphasis added)).
140. See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no necessary connection between the
formality of procedure and the power of the entity administering the procedure to resolve
authoritatively questions of law.”).
141. Id. at 252 (“Chevron . . . made no mention of the ‘relatively formal administrative
procedure[s],’ . . . that the Court today finds the best indication of an affirmative intent by Congress
to have ambiguities resolved by the administering agency.” (citation omitted)).
142. See id. at 239–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007) (noting
that “as long as interpretive changes create no unfair surprise-and the [agency’s] recourse to noticeand-comment rulemaking in an attempt to codify its new interpretation . . . makes any such surprise
unlikely here-the change in interpretation alone presents no separate ground for disregarding the
[agency’s] present interpretation” (citations omitted)).
145. See, e.g., Okla. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(finding that unfair surprise was not an issue when determining the validity of an EPA ruling on
national air quality standards).
146. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 486 (Foundation Press 10th ed., 2003) (“[F]ormal rulemakings have become quite
rare.”). See also LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 207–08 (noting the
origins of formal rulemaking in administrative law).
147. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 146, at 669–72 (discussing the issues biased agency
actions create and how formal rulemaking may prevent them).
148. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224–25 (noting that the Mead Corporation imports day planners that
were tariffed as a result of the EPA’s promulgation).
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This party could effectively protect itself by shifting the costs of increased
import duties forward “downstream” to the ultimate consumer. The importers’
profit levels would not be reduced or impaired by the validity of the action
actually taken or by the method of dissemination selected by the Customs
officials in Mead.
Therefore, Justice Scalia viewed the Mead majority’s addition of a step to the
implementation of the agency’s determination as a modification to the Chevron
test to include only agencies that act through one of the “safe harbor” methods.149
This additional step would negatively impact agency discretion with regard to
the promulgation method that the agency could otherwise freely select.150 This
interpretation would potentially snatch Chevron deference from agency
decisions in circumstances where such agencies had been assigned
congressional authority to interpret a silent or ambiguous statute.151
For Justice Scalia, the result of such a ruling would be that agencies would
not know whether their interpretation would be accorded Chevron deference
until the case reached a court.152 The court would then be limited to a
determination as to whether or not the agency had acted with some potentially
mysterious “force of law.”153 It would be legally inappropriate and certainly
disconcerting to litigants to reach this determination at this stage in the legal
process.154 A potentially favorable agency interpretation could be nullified
based upon conclusions that the agency failed to promulgate in its interpretation
through some form of formal rulemaking procedure.155
However, some support exists for the assertion that the majority sought to
preserve some degree of future flexibility.156 The Mead majority seemed to
acknowledge that there are some unarticulated instances when, despite the lack
of a formal procedure, an agency’s action would not necessarily mean that it
should be denied Chevron deference.157

149. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]nformal rulemaking and formal adjudication are the
only more-or-less safe harbors from the storm that the Court has unleashed . . . .”).
150. Id. (holding that “informal rulemaking-which the Court was once careful to make
voluntary unless required by statute . . . will now become a virtual necessity” (citations omitted)).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[l]itigants cannot then assume that the
statutory question is one for the courts”).
153. Id. (“Whereas previously a reasonable agency application of an ambiguous statutory
provision had to be sustained so long as it represented the agency’s authoritative interpretation,
henceforth such application can be set aside unless it appears that Congress delegated authority . .
. to make rules carrying the force of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154. Id. at 240–41.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., id. at 230, 237–38 (arguing for flexibility between the Chevron and Skidmore
tests).
157. Id. at 230–31 (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case . . . .”).
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3. Scalia Advocates Against Inefficiency in Administrative Law Due to Lack
of Formal Rulemaking Procedures
Finally, Justice Scalia expressed concern that if a court rejected an agency’s
interpretation because the agency failed to promulgate the interpretation through
a formal proceeding, and the court made a conflicting judicial interpretation,
then the agency could merely promulgate its desired interpretation through a
formal proceeding.158 The court could then be forced to reverse its earlier
opinion upon subsequent challenge to the formal agency action.159 Such
possibilities raise the issue of an agency possibly being allowed to easily
overturn a court’s stare decisis, thereby demoting the power constitutionally
assigned to the judiciary to nothing more than advisory-opinion status.160
There may be flaws that inherently exist in such a point of view. Although
the Mead Court may not have fully addressed this point, it specifically addressed
the same point about four years in Brand X.161 Justice Scalia perceived this later
articulation by the Supreme Court majority in Brand X as simply a “belated
remediation of Mead . . . .”162
The Supreme Court in Brand X pointed out that simply because an agency has
acted within one of the mentioned “safe harbor” methods163 does not necessarily
mean that Congress intended to assign any absolute authority to the agency.164
This assertion means that the agency would be precluded from taking subsequent
formal action to coerce the court into ruling against its own stare decisis if the
judiciary had initially ruled against an agency interpretation and substituted a
judicial interpretation.165
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S BRAND X DISSENT
A. The Brand X Majority Opinion
In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that Congress had indeed assigned to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to fill any gaps and

158. Id. at 247–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 248.
160. Id. at 247–48 (“Approving this procedure would be a landmark abdication of judicial
power.”).
161. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)
(“Since Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an
agency is charged with administering is not authoritative, the agency’s decision to construe that
statute differently from a court does not say that the court’s holding was legally wrong.”).
162. See id. at 1018 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See supra text accompanying note 115.
164. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 1015–17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (extrapolating the effects of the majority’s
allowance for “judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive officers”).
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interpret any ambiguities within the Communications Act166 as permitted under
Chevron deference.167 The Court ruled that the Communications Act was
ambiguous with respect to the type of internet service providers that fell within
the “telecommunications servic[e]” regulations.168 The FCC had interpreted the
statute to mean that broadband cable internet service providers were not among
those regulated.169
The Supreme Court, as with respect to the Chevron decision twenty years
prior, determined that it was Congress’ intent to empower an administering
agency to fill any gaps or interpret any ambiguities left in a statute by
Congress.170 The Court concluded that judicial interpretation should only play
a role in initially determining whether a statute was unambiguous or not.171
Therefore, by virtue of this approach, the agency was precluded from making
any conflicting interpretations.172 The Court ruled that the FCC had the requisite
congressional authority to receive Chevron deference,173 and therefore, judicial
intervention was not justified.174
B. Scalia’s Dissent: Invalidation of Legal Precedent
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s majority opinion for two reasons.175
First, Justice Scalia believed that this ruling allowed an agency to actively and
legally invalidate a prior judicial interpretation of a statute.176 Second, Scalia
contemplated that the majority’s decision might be interpreted to legally
empower an agency to disregard established judicial legal precedent.177
1. Scalia’s First Concern: Empowering Agencies to Overturn Statutory
Rulings
In Justice Scalia’s first argument, he articulated that the majority opinion
potentially allowed an agency to overturn a Supreme Court ruling by the
agency’s own enunciation of the “best” interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
166. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (West 2014)).
167. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81 (“Congress ha[d] delegated to the [FCC] the authority to
‘execute and enforce’ the Communications Act . . . and to ‘prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary . . . to carry out the provisions’ of the Act.”).
168. Id. at 980–81.
169. Id. at 978–79.
170. Id. at 980–82.
171. Id. at 982–83.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 981–82.
175. Id. at 1016–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (“A court’s interpretation is conclusive, the Court says, only if it holds that
interpretation to be ‘the only permissible reading of the statute,’ and not if it merely holds it to be
‘the best reading.’”).
177. Id. at 1018–19.
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provision.178 Such empowerment would permit Supreme Court decisions on
issues of law to be later overruled or reversed by an agency’s decision.179 Justice
Scalia had addressed this precise concern almost five years earlier when Mead
was decided.180 Furthermore, if Scalia’s interpretation of the majority opinion
is correct, the majority’s position goes against the fundamental legal principles
of U.S. law that state that once the U.S. Supreme Court has made an
interpretation, each such interpretation is the supreme law of the land throughout
the United States and its territories.181
Justice Scalia reasoned that if the Supreme Court decided that an agency
decision was not entitled to Chevron deference, this decision by the Court would
amount to a judicial interpretation.182 Thus, if the agency subsequently used a
formal process of promulgation to announce its decision, then the court’s earlier
decision—that the agency’s action was null and void because of the means that
it used to promulgate its interpretation—could potentially be reversed because
the agency would have re-promulgated its earlier decision using a viable “force
of law” source of authority.183
However, Justice Scalia’s reasoning is not entirely convincing. The majority
arguably concluded that if the judiciary was put in a situation in which it was
required to interpret a statute prior to an agency’s opportunity to do so, then the
administering agency should not be precluded from making a different
interpretation.184 This conclusion would be valid where Congress had assigned
express or implied authority to the agency to make a pertinent interpretation.185
After all, Congress is a branch of government coequal to the judiciary.186
The Brand X Court pointed out that “whether Congress has delegated to an
agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which
the judicial and administrative constructions occur.”187 On the contrary,
congressional delegation of authority to an agency to interpret a statute under
Chevron “established a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a
178. Id. at 1016–17.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333–35 (1816) (establishing
that the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over state courts as well as federal courts,
and that its decisions are final and binding).
182. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1016–17. See also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (exploring
an agency’s ability “to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in [a] statute”).
184. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983–84. See also Geyser, supra note 25, at 2156–67 (“Justice
Scalia’s concerns are unfounded and . . . Brand X has not created a constitutional problem.”)
185. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83.
186. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009) (“The
Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath [that Members of
the judiciary take] to uphold the Constitution of the United States.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
187. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983.
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statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.”188
Therefore, the Supreme Court majority acknowledged that a court could be
placed in a situation where there is a case in controversy concerning an
ambiguous or silent statute that the administering agency has not yet
interpreted.189 Should this occurrence materialize, the court has a duty to make
a judicial determination as to the best interpretation.190 However, the Court
conceded that when Congress has assigned the “first and foremost”191 authority
to exercise its discretion in interpreting a statute to an agency, it is because
“agencies are better equipped to make” “difficult policy choices.”192
Furthermore, courts should defer to the administering agency once that agency
has formulated a different interpretation.193 Essentially, courts must find a way
to attain non-interference with the fundamental doctrine of judicial precedent,194
while simultaneously acknowledging that “[t]here should be greater readiness to
abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded may[,] . . . in its
origin[,] . . . [be] the product of institutions or conditions which have [changed]
. . . with the progress of [time].”195
This reasoning does not necessarily mean that the judicial interpretation is not
legally binding.196 Rather, unless a court has determined that the statute is
unambiguous, it is the intent of Congress that the agency’s interpretation should
be preeminent.197 This simply means that Congress intended to grant the
administering agency discretion to interpret the statute differently than the court,
provided that such an interpretation is reasonable.198
The settled law—undisturbed by issues related to the parameters of Chevron
deference—was enunciated in Mead and explained by Justice Breyer in his
concurring opinion in Brand X.199 In Mead, as aforementioned, the Supreme
188. Id. at 982.
189. See id. (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
190. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
191. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
192. See id. at 980.
193. Id.
194. See Geyser, supra note 25, at 2156–67 (internal quotation marks omitted) (arguing that
courts still “say what the law is” by establishing boundaries within which agencies may operate).
195. CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 151.
196. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 171 (1803) (“[A] legal question
[is] properly determinable in the courts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
197. See text accompanying supra note 187.
198. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
199. See id. at 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Court concluded that if a court determined that an agency did not have
congressional authority to make a particular statutory interpretation, then a
court’s decision is not at risk of having its ruling overturned.200 This conclusion
is correct because the use of a formal process by an agency in such circumstances
would be to no avail.201 As Justice Breyer explained: “Congress may have
intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency,
irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that interpretation . . .
.”202
Should an agency misconstrue the court’s decision and purport to override the
judicial interpretation through the activation of a formal process, the court is
obligated to initiate its judicial inquiry based on the Chevron criteria to
determine congressional intent in the particular circumstances.203 If the court
determines that no congressional intent to assign the agency such authority
exists, then no degree of formality of process taken by an agency is legally
capable of overturning the judicial interpretation under scrutiny.204
2. Scalia’s Second Concern: Affording Agencies Chevron Deference
Justice Scalia’s second argument addresses the discernment of the Court’s
meaning in light of the language that the Supreme Court used in addressing
whether or not an agency should be afforded Chevron deference.205 Essentially,
he questions whether the Court’s majority opinion could empower an agency—
acting without the congressional authority—to interpret statutory ambiguities so
as to invalidate a judicial decision.206 He seems to suggest that the term “best”
interpretation, rather than “only” interpretation, could place the judicial holding
in a precarious position that could fundamentally impact future statutory
interpretation.207
However, Justice Scalia may have overlooked a potentially credible
alternative. Inherent judicial power allows a court to stay the legal proceedings
and formally seek the agency’s “best” interpretation by presenting the agency
with a court request for a determination of the pertinent statute.208 A branch of
government (the judiciary) seeking a determination from another coequal branch
of government (the executive), in circumstances where a third coequal branch
of government (the legislature) had expressly or impliedly empowered an
200. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 236–38 (2001).
201. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
203. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–30.
204. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83.
205. See id. at 1018 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1016–17.
207. Id. at 1018–19.
208. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary’s inherent power to
make law). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (West 2014) (describing the scope of the judiciary’s power
when reviewing agency action).
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agency by statute to resolve such an issue is entirely rational conduct. The
previously-stayed court action would resume upon the agency providing an
official determination of its “best interpretation” to the court. Chevron deference
jurisprudence would also apply to such agency determinations. Of course, if the
court was determining whether or not an agency determination should be
accorded Chevron deference, and the court ruled that neither gaps nor
ambiguities existed in the statute, the court should conclude that only the courts’
interpretation could conceivably be legally tenable.
IV. THE DEGREE OF HARMONY OR CONFLICT BETWEEN JUSTICE SCALIA’S
TWO DISSENTING OPINIONS AND THE “ORTHODOX” PRINCIPLES RELATING TO
THE “CHEVRON FRAMEWORK” IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS
A comparison between Justice Scalia’s dissents in Mead209 and in Brand X210
raises the specter of inconsistency in his reasoning. In Mead, the Supreme Court
did not accord Chevron deference in interpreting the agency’s action,211 whereas
in Brand X the Court afforded the agency’s decision Chevron deference.212
Justice Scalia’s central argument in both his Mead and Brand X dissents centers
on each case’s majority narrowing the original Chevron analysis.213
Justice Scalia’s opinion in his Brand X dissent arguably extends his
substantive viewpoint expressed in his Mead dissent.214 In his Mead dissent,
however, Justice Scalia reasoned that the majority was modifying and
reconfiguring Chevron deference doctrine in such a way that it did not apply to
the agency’s decision.215 Rather, according to Scalia, the Mead majority
concluded that Customs should not be accorded the deference to which that
administrative agency’s determination was entitled under Chevron deference
parameters.216
However, Customs was not assigned express power by Congress “to make
rules carrying the force of law” with regard to the use of Ruling Letters.217
Notwithstanding this absence of express conferral of power by Congress, Justice
Scalia was apparently influenced by the Solicitor General’s conclusions.218
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 149–151, 205–07 and accompanying text.
214. Compare Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1005–20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), with United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 239–61 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Mead, 533 U.S. at 256–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 226–27.
218. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no doubt that . . . Customs . . .’s interpretation
represents the authoritative view of the agency. . . . [T]he . . . United States has filed a brief . . . that

158

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:133

Scalia preferred to apply the maxim of facilitating the “triumph of substance
over form” rather than the majority’s somewhat talismanic “force of law”
focus.219
A “force of law” discussion did not predominate in the Chevron opinion,
although the EPA had express Congressional authority to administer the statute
that the EPA was interpreting, justifying the Chevron deference.220 However,
Scalia’s dissent is supported by the mandatory empowerment of the Customs
Service, pursuant to Ruling Letters issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to
“fix the final classification and rate of duty applicable to [imported] merchandise
under the [Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States].”221 The majority’s
absolute focus on the specific agent empowered to issue Ruling Letters could be
perceived as elevating form over substance.222
Finally, the Customs department in Mead was not assigned by Congress the
unconditional degree of power necessary to administer the pertinent statute
comparable to the degree assigned to the EPA in Chevron.223 The Mead majority
concluded that this disparate assignment of power by Congress when comparing
Chevron with Mead justified and supported the difference in the two
decisions.224
Turning to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Brand X, his primary concern was the
risk of an agency being accorded the legal power to nullify a prior judicial
interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court.225 Justice Scalia perceived the
FCC’s determination as behavior in an adjudicative capacity.226 He reasoned
that the FCC’s determination should not, based on the Mead decision, be
accorded the Chevron level of administrative deference because Congress had
not expressly assigned the necessary level of legal authority to the FCC.227
However, the Mead majority provided two examples of how congressional
authority could be seen, such as the agency acting with “notice-and-comment

represents the position set forth in the ruling letter to be the official position of the Customs Service.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). See also Beermann, supra note 51, at 826 (“Justice Scalia’s
opinion suggests an alternate path: Chevron deference should apply whenever an interpretation
reflects the official position of an agency on a matter that would otherwise qualify for Chevron
deference . . . .”).
219. Mead, 533 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
221. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221–22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See id. at 221.
223. Compare supra note 78 and accompanying text (providing that the Chevron court found
express authority for the EPA’s actions), with supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text
(concluding that the Mead court found Congress did not grant Customs authority).
224. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 232–33.
225. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
226. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1016–17
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1015–17.
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rulemaking or formal adjudication,” or if the agency failed to act with
“administrative formality,” it would not be awarded Chevron deference.228
There is both harmony and conflict inherent in Justice Scalia’s two dissents.229
Justice Scalia asserts that the majority is not following its own stare decisis.230
Although in one dissent Justice Scalia concluded that the administering agency
should have been accorded Chevron deference,231 and in the other opinion he
finds differently,232 this difference does not necessarily discredit his reasoning.
Although it may appear on the surface that Justice Scalia is contradicting his
own dissent in Mead by his reasoning in his Brand X dissent, a more careful and
reflective analysis, reveals that Justice Scalia may essentially be striving for the
ascendancy of substance over form.233
V. CONCLUSION
The founders may have concluded that certain structural agencies of the
executive branch234 should evolve rather than be rigidly set in the U.S.
Constitution immediately. Or, the founders may have concluded that it was best
to err on the side of restraint. One member of the judiciary has expressed the
view that “the administrative process may well be efficient in achieving its goals
. . . .”235 Regardless, the evolution of agencies has been simultaneously both
perpetual and permanent in the hands of the legislature236 assisted by the
watchful vigilance of the judiciary.237 However, a cautionary admonition from
two commentators may prove to be prescient.238
228. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31. See also Dickinson, supra note 34, at 705, at 687 (“Mead’s
focus is on formality.” (emphasis added)).
229. See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
230. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 239.
232. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 24, at 690 (noting that the Supreme Court decisions in Mead
and Brand X are a “remarkable transformation of the paradigm of agency work from the preChevron years . . . to the distorted reality of Chevron”).
234. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[M]odern administrative agencies fit most comfortably within the Executive Branch
. . . .”).
235. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 575 (articulating the rationale for the
creation of agencies).
236. See City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (“Congress knows to speak in plain terms
when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency
discretion.”).
237. Id. at 1876 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Although
seemingly complex in abstract description, in practice this framework has proved a workable way
to approximate how Congress would likely have meant to allocate interpretive law-determining
authority between reviewing court and agency.”).
238. See Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 61 (“The more Chevron
mandates deference, the more power flows from the judiciary to the executive. For those who place
faith in the courts as the primary engine of justice, that is unwelcome.” (emphasis added)).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decision in Chevron has successfully
contributed to the continuing evolution and development of agencies and their
role as an integral part of one of the three coequal branches of government in the
United States. The Chevron decision and the subsequent Chevron deference
jurisprudence that the decision has fostered have effectively calmed this area of
administrative law.239 As Judge Easterbrook has observed: “[W]e’re all trying
to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court.”240 Indeed, it seems that some
peripheries of the doctrine have mellowed since the Chevron decision.241 Other
contentions that continue to rage unabated essentially relate to issues tangential
to Chevron deference.242 However, in light of the 2013 Supreme Court decision
in City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, penned by Justice Scalia,243 in spite of his
dissents244 in Mead and Brand X, it may even be safe to conclude that Justice
Scalia has returned to the fold.

239. See, e.g., id. at 73 (“The great debate over Chevron’s soul [has] ended with nary a
whimper, much less a bang.”).
240. See Interview with United States Court of Appeals Judges: Frank H. Easterbrook, 15
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 15 (2013).
241. See, e.g., Lawson & Kam, Chevron’s Origins, supra note 1, at 73 (“The debate is
effectively settled whether deference is generally due to agency legal interpretations even regarding
pure or abstract legal questions . . . .” (emphasis added)).
242. Id. (“Chevron continues to be a contentious subject across a wide range of other issues
for which resolutions are much less likely, clear, or both.” (emphasis added)).
243. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013). See also Posner,
Scalia’s Incoherence, supra note 3, at 5 (“Justice Scalia has called himself . . . a ‘faint-hearted
originalist.’”).
244. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 25, at 1444 (“Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s doomsday
forecast, the majority believed that Mead was justified in principle. The Court stated that Mead
‘tailors deference to [the] variety’ of administrative procedures that Congress envisions and
agencies employ.”). See also Geyser, supra note 25, at 2131 (arguing that “Justice Scalia’s
concerns are unfounded and . . . Brand X does not permit agencies to ‘overrule’ courts”).

